Kh-35 air to ship missile

Kh-35 (3M24) Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) Following a decision made in April 1984, OKB Zvezda started work on a "universal" (sea-, air- and coastal-launched) anti-ship missile, designated the Kh-35 (air launched) or 3M24 (sea launched). It was almost an copy of the US AGM-84 Harpoon, with the same concept, layout, and similar characteristics. The air-launched missile could be fired from altitudes from 200 to 5,000 m and had a range of 150 km. The missile was designed to engage small and fast vessels, such as enemy missile and torpedo boats and small assault ships. It could also attack transport ships with displacements of up to 5,000 tons. It was then assumed that such types of targets did not require sophisticated missile systems like the Moskit or Oniks, which were designed to engage frigates, cruisers, destroyers, and larger transport ships, especially those in convoys protected by frigates or destroyers. That is why the Uran missile is small and less sophisticated, as well as having a seeker optimized for low-RCS targets and able to track fast-moving objects. It has also low-weight high- explosive, fragmentation/incendiary warhead (believed to weigh 145 kg, though some sources say 90 kg). In the early 1990s, a sea-launched version of the missile, dubbed the 3M24, was tested. This version has a range of 130 km and has a solid-rocket booster with a turbojet engine for cruise. The cruise phase is conducted at 10-15 m in altitude at a speed of up to 300 m/sec. The terminal phase is conducted at an altitude of 3-5 m at the same speed. The missile employs the ARGS-35 active radar seeker The typical sea launcher, designated KT-184, has four angled tubes. Four such launchers (16 missiles) are mounted on modified Tarantul-class vessels. The ships have been exported to Vietnam, and a single ship is used by the Russian Navy for trials and training of foreign crews. Space for four launchers can also be found on a single new Russian "Project 1154" frigate. The ship, the Neustrashimiy , was commissioned in 1993 and serves with the Baltic Fleet, but the launchers have never actually been mounted on it. Also, two "Project 1135" Krivak I-class frigates - the Legkiy and the Pilkyi - were modernized to the "Project 1135.2" standard, receiving two four- tube launchers for the 3M24 Uran system. Through 2002 the ships have not carried any actual missiles, only empty stands for the launchers. The ships also received the MR-755 Fregat (NATO: Half Plate) radar for target designation and the Garpun-Bal (NATO: Plank Shave) radar for fire control. The Garpun-Bal combines quickly switchable active and passive modes. In the active target- designation mode, it operates in I/J band and can detect and track up to 150 targets. The radar's range is 35-45 km. The passive channel searches for pulse and continuous-wave signals. When a signal is located, the radar identifies the hostile emitter from a library of up to 1,000 signatures. The signal's bearing is also measured. The maximum range of the passive channel is over 100 km, depending on the frequency. Aside from Vietnam, the other export customer of the Uran system is the Indian Navy. Four Delhi- class destroyers are armed with 16 Uran launchers apiece. The ships are also equipped with Russian-made MR-755 Fregat and Garpun-Bal radar sets. Other Indian ships on which 3M24 Uran system is used are four P-25A type corvettes. They also have four quadruple KT-184 launchers.



In addition to the anti-ship version of the Uran system, a Glonass-controlled, land-attack variant has also been developed: the 3M24M Uranium (3M24E1 in export). The 3M24E1 system will be introduced into service with the Indian Navy. It carries more fuel, extending its maximum range to 250 km. An imaging-infrared seeker, in place of the active radar seeker, has reportedly also been tested on a basic 3M24 missile. 3M24 (Kh-35) Uran The Kh-35 (3M24 Uran) missile is similar to the US Harpoon. Like the Harpoon, it is deployable on a wide variety of platforms, with ship- and air-launched and coastal-defense versions available. It is an autonomous weapon using an inertial system for initial guidance, followed by an active radar seeker for the final stage. The latter is equipped with home-on-jam and ECCM capabilities. The air- launched version has TV-guided and IR variants, designated Kh-37 Uranium. An air-launched version entered limited service in 1994. The missile's power plant consists of a solid-fuel booster and a turbojet sustainer. Russian Designation 3M24 (ship launched); Kh-35 Uran (air-launched) NATO / DoD Designation SS-N-25 Switchbalde Manufacturer Zvezda Design Bureau Guidance Mid-course autopilot; terminal active/ passive radar seeker (TV and possible IR seeker for some export models) Warhead 145 kg semi-armor piercing incendiary Propulsion one solid-fuel boosters, turbojet sustainer Range 130 km Speed Mach 0.95 / 315 m/sec Length 3.75 m Body Diameter 420 mm Wingspan 930 mm Launch Weight 630 kg Development Start 1984 Date Operational 1993 (ship launched), 1994 (air launched) Launch Platforms Ships: Project 1135.4 (Krivak IV), Project 1454 (Neustrashimy), Project 1166.1 (Gepard) –class frigates, Project 1241.8 (Tarantul IV) -class corvettes. Project 151A (Sassnitz) -class fast missile boats Air: Tu-142 Bear, MiG-29K Fulcrum, Su-27K Flanker, Su-32 Fullback, Ka-27 Helix Users Russia, India, China, Vietnam and Algeria

Moskit SS-N-22 Sunburn anti ship missile

P-270 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) In the early 1970s, it became obvious that the P-15 family no longer met the requirements of the current naval battlespace, which called for better penetration capabilities and longer range. To meet the new requirements, a team from MKB Raduga (Dubna) started working on a new, supersonic, sea-skimming anti-ship missile that would be designated the 3M80 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn), which is also referred as the P-270 system in numerous Russian sources.

The P-270 (3M80) Moskit is a medium-range high-supersonic anti-ship missile with sea-skimming capability that came into service in the 1980s and was designed to attack ships with a sophisticated command-and-control system. Earlier versions were designated P-80 Zubr. Its guidance is by an inertial system with final-stage homing by an active radar seeker. The latter has a home-on-jam capability. Associated with the Moskit is the Band Stand radar, which operates over the frequency ranges from D to F and acts as an air and search radar, with a secondary tracking function for anti-ship missiles. As with several of the Russian long- and medium-range missiles, the fire-control system also receives data from the ship's helicopters using the I/J-band Big Bulge radar to provide radar pictures for mid-course guidance updates if necessary. The Moskit is a ramjet- powered missile with a slim forward body, ovoid nose, and a fatter rear half with four divided air intakes. There are four clipped delta-platform wings and four smaller tail surfaces of similar shape, organized in a cruciform configuration around the fuselage. It is a main armament of Sovremenny- class destroyers.


A new active/ passive radar-guidance system was developed by GosNPO Altair. The radar works in switchable modes, from active search to passive track of the target's radar and electronic-countermeasures (ECM) signals (home on jam). The Moskit missile has the typical missile shape, with "X" scheme wings at mid-fuselage and "X" all- moving control surfaces in the rear. The missile is powered by a ramjet-type, liquid-fuel sustainer and a solid-rocket booster, which is used in the first four seconds of flight. The missile's range is 120 km (high-low profile) or 80 km (low profile), or 160 and 120 km, respectively, for the 3M82 Moskit-M version. These ranges include maneuvers, so theoretically a missile could reach longer distances if it flew directly. The missile's speed is Mach 2.6 (2,800 kmph) at high altitude and Mach 1.5 (1,800 kmph) at low altitude. At 10 km from its target, the time until impact is less than 20 seconds, leaving little opportunity for reaction. Also, the passive radar mode enables the missile to detect active jamming sources and use them for homing. This and other features of the missile's radar seeker make it very ECM resistant. Work on the Moskit missile started in 1973, and it was accepted into service in 1981 in its initial 3M80 / P-80 version (93 km range) and in 1984 in the subsequent 3M80M / P-80M (3M80E in export) version (120 km range). The final version of the missile is the 3M82 Moskit-M / P-270 , with the range extended to 150-160 km. It is fired from the KT-190M launcher. Series production of the missile continues at the AKK Progress factory in Arsenyev. The 3M80 and 3M80M missile systems were introduced to service with "Project 956" Sovremenny- class destroyers, while the 3M82 entered service on slightly modified later ships of the type. In total, 18 of both sub- variants were commissioned between 1980 and 1999 for the Russian Navy (one was reportedly stored, incomplete due to a lack of funding). Two more have been built and commissioned in from 2000 to 2001 by the Chinese Navy (with 3M80E systems). Each destroyer is armed with eight launchers, in two KT-190 boxes of four launchers each. The Mineral (NATO: Band Stand) ire-control system consists of a radar set integrated with a passive radio/ radar receiver.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Soviet and later the Russian Navy also received 34 small ships of the "Project 1241.1RZ" Molnya-M class (NATO: Tarantul III), 28 of which remain in Russian service today. One was transferred to Ukraine in 1997, and five were decommissioned due to a lack of funds. The ships are a modified version of the "Project 1241.1" Molnya class (Tarantul II), which were armed with four launchers for P-15M Termit missiles. Under Project 1241.1RZ, these were replaced with four launchers for P-270 Moskit missiles: two KT-152 boxes with two launchers each. The ships also have the smaller Titanit (NATO: Band Stand) fire-control system, also of the active/passive type. The last type of ship that employs the 3M80 Moskit system is the "Project 1239" Sivuch (Bora / Dergach -class) small missile air-cushioned vessel, of which two were commissioned (in 1989 and 1992). The Bora-class is armed with eight launchers, similar to Sovremenny-class destroyers. One of these ships serve with the Russian Baltic Fleet (41st Brigade), and one serves with the Russian Black Sea Fleet (36th Brigade). The 3M80/82 Moskit system is one of the most successful Russian anti-ship missiles. It is designed to be employed against smaller NATO naval groups in the Baltic Sea (Danish and German) and the Black Sea (Turkish) and non-NATO vessels in the Pacific (Japanese, South Korean, etc.). The other main targets were to be NATO amphibious groups. Against the latter, small vessels were to conduct attacks in groups of two to four ships in hit-and-run-type attacks, firing eight to 16 missiles in a coordinated salvo. The Moskit's computerized mission-planning system enables a given salvo, fired over a period of time, to have routes preset so that the entire salvo arrives at the target area at the same moment. Similar tactics were to be used against transport ships in coastal waters, although fewer missiles were to be fired (two to four against a single target). Destroyers armed with the Moskit were intended to operate in larger naval attack groups formed around cruisers. The purpose of such groups during the Cold War was to protect the Northern Area (the so-called "Bastion") against penetration by US submarines and carrier groups, to support Soviet amphibious operations, and - in favorable conditions - to engage trans-Atlantic shipment and disrupt sea lines of communication between the US and Europe. Presently, in the Russian Navy, the Moskit-armed destroyers are intended to fight ships such as cruisers, destroyers, and frigates that are part of a carrier group or, more frequently, operating separately in groups. Although the Cold War is over, the US Navy is still treated as an adversary by the Russian Navy. It is also commonly understood that if the Russian Navy is able to counter US fleet elements, it is able to defeat any other enemy. P-270 Moskit The missile is powered by a ramjet-type, liquid-fuel sustainer and a solid-rocket booster, which is used in the first four seconds of flight. The missile's range is 120 km (high-low profile) or 80 km (low profile), or 160 and 120 km, respectively, for the 3M82 Moskit-M version. These ranges include maneuvers, so theoretically a missile could reach longer distances if it flew directly. The missile's speed is Mach 3 at high altitude and Mach 2.2 at low altitude. The passive radar mode enables the missile to detect active jamming sources and use them for homing. This and other features of the missile's radar seeker make it very ECM resistant.

Russian Designation P-80 Zubr (3M80) P-80M Moskit (3M82) P-270 Moskit-M (3M82M) NATO / Designation SS-N-22 Sunburn
Manufacturer Raduga Design Bureau Guidance Mid-course autopilot; terminal active / passive radar seeker Warhead 320 kg HE semi-armor piercing or 200 kT nuclear Propulsion Solid-rocket accelerator, liquid-fuel ramjet sustainer
Range 93 km 120 km 160 km
Speed Mach 2.6 / 865 m/sec
Mach 3 / 1000 m/sec Length 9.385 m 9.72 m 9.73 m
Body Diameter 1,298 mm Wingspan 1,900 mm 2,100 mm
Launch Weight 3,950 kg n.k. 4,150 kg
Development Start 1973 n.k. n.k.
Date Operational 1980 1984 Mid 1990s
Launch Platforms Project 956 (Sovremenny), Project 1155B (Udaloy II) -class destroyers, Project 1241.1MR (Tarantul III)missile boat, Project 1239 (Bora / Dergach) –class fast missile corvettes Users Russia and China

P-700 Granit SS-N-19 Shipwreck missile

Russia P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) The development of the P-700 missile system started in 1969, but it was prolonged due to its complexity. It was assumed that the main source of information would be the satellite-based reconnaissance network, and from the very beginning, it was believed that the missile would be able to communicate with it directly after launch. The initial targeting information was to be received by a submarine cruising at a depth of about 30 m via a long-wave communications system from ground bases. The attack was to be coordinated with a group of long-range Tu-22M anti-ship aircraft. The underwater attack group consists of three to five Oscar and Oscar II subs, each armed with 24 P-700 missiles. The subs were to launch 70-120 such missiles against a single carrier group in a single mass attack. Roughly 30-50% of them are aimed at the carrier, while the others go after accompanying ships. Another salvo of 12-24 missiles was to be launched by aircraft, mainly to saturate the carrier group's defenses. The 30-knot speed of the Oscar I/II submarines enables a rapid approach to the launch area, about 450-500 km from the carrier group, and equally quick evasion after the attack. The missile employs all of the techniques from the Bazalt / Vulkan. One lead missile per every 24 in the salvo flies at high altitude to reconnoiter the target, using its radar in active and passive modes. The active mode is used in quick "looks," then turned off to increase the penetration probability. The lead missile assigns targets to all subordinate missiles and communicates with the other lead missiles in the massive salvo to coordinate the attack. To achieve this, the missile is equipped with a powerful digital computer with three processors. The missile has an onboard integrated electronic-countermeasures suit for avoiding enemy anti-missile attacks using a combination of maneuver and deception jamming. The computer could order the missile to one of various stored courses with multiple altitudes. At high altitude, the missile speed is Mach 2.5, while at low (sea-skimming) altitude, it is Mach 1.5. Vital parts of the missile are armored to increase penetration against fire from Phalanx-type close-in weapon systems and against fragments of closely exploding air-defense missiles. The missile has a nuclear warhead with a selectable yield of 200 or 350 kT, or a conventional 750 kg unitary shaped charge, or bomblets (primary for anti-ship attack, but also useable against land targets: 750 x 1 kg, a mix of incendiary, AP, HE, which can be varied to meet requirements). The missile has a KR-93 turbojet which is used in the cruising phase after the missile has been launched with the aid of an intregal solid propellant booster in the tail. There are two sharply swept-back wings and two swept-back tail fins with a stabiliser on the top side of the missile. The seeker is reported to operate in ESM, J-band (10-12 GHz) and K-band (27-40 GHz) modes, using the last in the terminal phase to select specific targets. The guidance system was developed by TsNII "Granit." The missile itself was developed in OKB-52 (later NPO Mashinostoyeniya) under the direction of Chelomey and, after his death in 1984, under Gerberd Efremov. First tests of the missile started in November 1975. Numerous difficulties prolonged the factory tests until 1979, and in autumn of that year, the missile began state trials. Technical difficulties further prolonged the trials through October 1983, and the missile was officially accepted into service in March 1983. At this time, the space-based Legenda reconnaissance system had been fully deployed. In addition to the satellite system, the submarine could also use its own MGK-540 Skat-3 sonar system for targeting. Only two Oscar I ships have been built: the K-525 (Arkhangelsk ) and K-206 (Murmansk ), commissioned in 1981 and 1983, respectively. Both remain in service with the Northern Fleet, and each are armed with 24 missiles and have Kasatka-U receivers for communication with the Legenda system. The subs were followed by the "ultimate" Oscar II class, of which 11 have been commissioned since 1986. The Northern Fleet operates the K-119 (Voronezh ), K-148 (Krasnodar ), K-410 (Smolensk ), K-266 (Orel ), K-186 (Omsk ), and K-150 (Tomsk ). The K-141 (Kursk ) exploded and sank on August 13, 2000. The Pacific Fleet operates the K-132 (Irkutsk ), K-173 (Krasnoyarsk ), K-442 (Chelabinsk ), and K-456 (Vyluchinsk ). The Russian Navy plans to commission a replacement for the Kursk, the K-329 (Belgorod ). The P-700 missile was also introduced to service as a weapon for surface ships. Four Kirov-class nuclear cruisers were commissioned between 1980 and 1998: the Kirov (renamed Admiral Ushakov ), Frunze (renamed Admiral Lazarev ), Kalinin (renamed Admiral Nakhimov ) and Yuriy Andropov (renamed Pyotr Velikiy ). They were armed with 20 semi-vertical (with some oblique, like in submarines) P-700 Granit launchers. The system was directly adapted from submarines - to the point where the launchers have to be filled with water before launch. Fire control is provided by the MR-212 Vaygach-U onboard radar and other ships' electronic systems (the Gurzuf or Kantata-M passive reconnaissance systems, for example). The first two cruisers were withdrawn from service in the late 1990s, but the Admiral Nakhimov and the Pyotr Velikiy continue to serve. The only other ship equipped with P-700 Granit system is the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznietsov , commissioned in 1990 and operational with Russian Northern Fleet since 1995. The ship is armed with 12 P-700 launchers.

Russian SS-N-12 anti ship missile

(SS-N-12 Sandbox) and P-1000 Vulkan Presently, the P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12 Sandbox) remains only on surface ships, but it is still one of the most capable Russian naval weapons. For a long time it was underestimated in the West. Since the missile was similar in appearance to the P-6/P-35 series, it was not even recognized for a long time, especially as the main armament of Echo II submarines. Development of the intended P-6/P-35 replacement was initiated on the very same day as the P- 120 Malakhit program (February 28, 1963). It was to be a surface-launched missile for both submarines and surface ships. To avoid any counterattack from a carrier group, the missile's range was to be 500 km, outside the usual operational radius of carrier-protection forces. At the same time, the guidance system and missile survivability were to be greatly improved and in line with evolving tactics. For the first time, it was assumed that any attack on a carrier group would be of a massive character. The tactics of such an attack is described later, but it is worth describing some P-500 Bazalt features beforehand. The P-500 missile is similar in appearance to the P-6/35 and was powered by a liquid-fuel sustainer and solid-rocket booster. It has a speed of Mach 2 at high altitude and Mach 1.5-1.6 at low altitude. The flight profile of the missile varies from 30 to 7,000 m (low-low or low-high). Guidance is based on a digital INS on a gyro- stabilized platform and an active-radar seeker, which periodically switches to passive mode. For the first time, the missile was equipped with a digital computer (Tsifrova Vichislenna Mashina, "digital computing device"). The guidance system was also equipped with a datalink to communicate between missiles in a salvo, with a salvo consisting of eight missiles launched at short intervals. Usually, one of the missiles flies high (5,000-7,000 m) to pick up the target, while the rest remain at medium to low altitude with their radar seekers switched to passive mode. The leading missile then transmits targeting data to the others and allocates individual targets, with half of the salvo directed at the aircraft carrier and half at other ships in the area, one apiece. The onboard radar seekers are turned on at the last moment, just before reaching the target. If the lead missile is shot down, another one (in a programmed sequence) takes over and climbs to a higher altitude to continue directing the salvo. All the missiles have active radar jamming to disrupt any defensive action from fighters and shipboard air-defense systems. In addition, vital parts of the P-500 missile are armored to increase survivability. Early trials of the first version of the P-500 system were conducted from 1969 to 1970, and from 1971-75, tests of the final version, with a 550 km range, were completed. The missile has a 1,000 kg HE warhead or a 350 kT-yield nuclear warhead. In 1975 the P-500 system was introduced to service on 10 out of the 29 Echo II-class submarines then in service. Nine of them received the Kasatka-B system for receiving data from the Uspekh and Legenda targeting systems (radar picture only), while one received the Uspekh interface only, without access to the Legenda space targeting system. Communications with targeting systems could be conducted from periscope depth with the antenna above the surface. Usually, Soviet submarines carried six conventional and two nuclear P-500 missiles on combat patrols. All of the submarines armed with P-500 missiles were withdrawn from service in the mid-1990s. The P-500 Bazalt system, however, was not only used on submarines. In 1977 the system was accepted into service onboard Kiev-class aircraft carriers, four of which were built. The first three had a battery of eight launchers in the forward deck. The last ship of the class, commissioned the Baku in 1987, was built to a modified design and had no less than 12 launchers. All of these ships were withdrawn from service in the 1990s, but the last ship, renamed Admiral Gorshkov , is to be sold to India - after stripping off the P-500 missiles. The only ships still armed with the P-500 Bazalt system are Slava-class cruisers. The first ship of the class, commissioned in 1983, underwent a major overhaul in the 1990s and was renamed the Moskva . It serves with the Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet. The Northern Fleet operates the Marshal Ustinov , commissioned in 1986, while the Pacific Fleet operates the Varyag , commissioned in 1989. According to unconfirmed sources, however, the last was re-armed with the P-1000 system (see below). The first two ships (and possibly all three) have a tremendous battery of 16 P-500 Bazalt missiles, which can be directed at targets with the assistance of embarked Ka- 27 Helix helicopters. A fourth cruiser, the Ukrainian Ukraina , was armed with the P-500 system. The ship was completed in late 2001, but after lengthy deliberations, it never entered service with the Ukrainian Navy. Declared spare, it now is to be sold abroad. The P-1000 Vulkan was one of the most mysterious missiles in Soviet service. It was also the last Russian missile that required a submarine to surface for launch. Its existence was never discovered by NATO, despite the fact it was operational on five submarines. It was generally similar to P-500 but had titanium armor, and many of its steel parts were replaced by titanium ones. This enabled a significant decrease in launch weight. At the same time, a more powerful booster and a more powerful and more fuel-efficient sustainer turbojet engine was employed. This increased the range to about 700 km. Its development was initiated in May 1979, and it underwent tests in the mid- 1980s. The P-1000 was introduced into service in about 1987. In the late 1980s, five Echo II-class submarines were modernized to accommodate the new P-1000 Vulkan system, but all five were withdrawn from service in the mid-1990s. Thus, it was in front-line service for only about seven or eight years (unless it has, in fact, been installed on the Varyag).

Russian Designation P-350 (4K77), P-500 Bazalt (4K80) P-1000 Vulkan (3M70)
NATO / Designation SS-N-12 Sandbox n.k.
Manufacturer NPO Mashinostroenia Chelomey
Guidance Mid-course autopilot; terminal active- radar
seeker Mid-course autopilot; terminal active-radar seeker and passive anti-radiation Warhead 1,000 kg HE semi-armor piercing or 350 kT nuclear Propulsion
two solid-fuel booster, liquid-fuel sustainer Range 550 km 700 km Speed Mach 2.5 / 835 m/sec Mach 2.8 / 935 m/sec Length 11.70 m n.k. Body Diameter 884 mm 884 mm Wingspan 2,600 mm n.k. Launch Weight 4,800 kg n.k. Development Start 1963 1979 Date Operational 1975 1987 Launch Platforms Project 1143 (Kiev) aircraft carriers, Project 1164 (Slava) cruisers, Project 675 (Echo II) submarines Project 675 (Echo II) submarines Users Russia and Ukraine

Russian ss n 27 anti ship missile

The Yekaterinburg-based Novator Design Bureau has developed a new cruise missile system designated Klub (NATO: SS-N-27 & SS-N-30) and is sometimes referred to as the Club, Biryuza and Alpha / Alfa. The Klub ASCM (anti-sub/ship cruise missile) has been designed to destroy submarine and ships and also engage static/slow-moving targets, whose co- ordinates are known in advance, even if these targets are protected by active defences and electronic countermeasures. There are presently, two 'known' modifications of the system; Klub-S (for submarines) and Klub-N (for surface vessels). The latter can be installed in vertical launch cells or in angled missile boxes, depending upon operational requirements. Both systems are based on common hardware, the only difference being the design of the missile launchers and the missile transport- launching containers. Both modifications come in the supersonic 3M54E or the subsonic 3M54E1 AShM (anti-ship missile) variant and the 3M14E LACM (Land Attack Cruise Missile) variant. Klub-S can also be armed with the 91RE1 anti-submarine missile and Klub-N with the 91RE2 anti-submarine missile. The Klub missile family. From the left 91RE2, 91RE1, 3M54E, 3M54E1

3M54E1 / 3M54E1 (SS-N-27 Sizzler) The 3M54E three-stage anti-ship missile consists of a booster, a subsonic cruise low-flying sustainer stage and a low-flying supersonic terminal stage. For surface vessels of smaller displacement or with shortened torpedo launchers, the system uses the 3M54E1 anti-ship missile, which has a booster and a subsonic cruise sustainer stage, but carries a heavier warhead than the 3M54E missile. After launch from either a vertical or angled deck-mounted launcher or from a submarine torpedo tube, the 3M54E and 3M54E1 follow similar trajectories. At an altitude of up to 150 metres, the solid-propellant booster is jettisoned, the under-fuselage air intake is extended, and the air-breathing sustainer engine is started. At the same time the wings and tail surfaces are extended, and the weapon descends to its cruising altitude of 10 to 15 metres above sea level. At a distance of up to 30 to 40 km from the target, the missile climbs to higher altitude and activates its ARGS-54 active homing radar seeker. The pointed nose of the supersonic rocket, which forms the payload of the deadly 3M54E AShM, protrudes from the front of the complete missile Developed by the Radar-MMS company of St. Petersburg, the ARGS-54 seeker has a maximum operational range of 60 km. As the missile continues towards the target at subsonic speed, the seeker scans from +45º to -45º in azimuth, and from and +10º to -20º in elevation. The ARGS-54 is 70 cm long, 42 cm in diameter, and weighs 40 kg without the radome. It can operate in precipitation conditions of up to 4mm/sec and in heavy sea conditions of up to sea state 6. After the target is detected and the seeker has locked on, the 3M54E1 flies on at high subsonic speed to destroy the target. The 3M54E, on the other hand, reaches its target in a different manner. At 20 km from the target, the 3M54E's supersonic solid rocket-powered third-stage terminal 'dart' separates from the missile, descends to 3 to 5 metres above sea level and accelerates to a supersonic speed of Mach 2.9 in a zigzagging terminal run to hit its target. On the one hand helps in penetration of the enemy ship's air defenses, but on the other hand, due the high velocity the missile to become aerodynamically heated, giving it a relatively high infrared signature. The 3M51E on display in 1996, by Novator NPO, in front of a Su-27IB Flanker. The scoop for the turbojet is visible to the rear of the missile. A universal FCS is used to plan the flight mission, upload this to the missile, and conduct pre-launch preparations. Both versions use a common shore-based system for planned inspection and maintenance of the missiles. Since the different types of missile are compatible with a common shipboard system, the user can load the vessel with whatever mix of weapons is best suited to the planned mission. An un-named official with the Novotar Design Bureau, when describing the 3M54E variant, said "The Alfa combines aspects of the U.S. Harpoon and French Exocet besides the U.S. Tomahawk. This configuration offers speed, better fuel economy and a greater accuracy rate than the current Western missiles. Once launched from ship, submarine or aircraft, the 1.5 ton missile cruises at subsonic speed 4.5 meters above the sea to evade radar."
The official adds, "At around 40 miles to its approach to the target, the forward section of the missile separates and ignites a solid booster, which rockets the missile to a supersonic speed of Mach 2.9. The purpose of this is to defeat current anti-missile systems with the Alfa missile's sheer speed. By the time the missile is within enemy radar range, it is already doing Mach 2.9. Within seconds it will be upon its target, even before existing anti-missile systems can fire their engines. Its ability to attack land targets is enhanced by a new homing and guidance system that put it in the Tomahawk league." The Klub presents new challenges to Western defenses like Phalanx CIWS and Aegis currently found aboard many Western-built naval vessels. The Klub-S ASCM is planned to be incorporated into Russia's next generation Amur Class submarine, reportedly of which the first vessel is being built for the Indian Navy. However, that is yet to be confirmed from reliable sources. Russian Designation 3M54E / P-900 Alfa / Klub-S 3M54E1 / P-900 Alfa / Klub-S
NATO Designation SS-N-27 Sizzler
Type Submarine-launched Anti-Ship missile Guidance Inertial plus Active Radar Homing Warhead 200 kg semi-armor piercing 400 kg semi-armor piercing Propulsion Solid-rocket booster and turbojet sustainer, rocket boosted penetrator Solid-rocket booster and turbojet sustainer
Range 220 km 300 km
Speed Cruise Mach 0.8,
terminal up to Mach 2.9
Length 8.22 m 6.20 m
Body Diameter 533 mm
Wingspan 3,100 mm
Launch Weight 2,300 kg
Flight Path Low-flying, sea-skimming

Chinese Navy 054A class missile frigate

after complete escort mission in Gulf of Aden Somalia
the East China Sea Fleet of the "Zhoushan" "Xuzhou" missile frigate and "Lake" supply ship


Zhoushan missile frigate is the first ship of the Chinese Navy Type 054A (NATO Jiangkai II class) missile frigate , hull number 529.

Type 054A missile frigate is the latest frigate of People's Liberation Army Navy, now includes 054 class frigates (Jiangkai class) a total of four ships in service. similar to France Lafayette-class frigates, but have strong firepower,its the most advanced world-class frigates.
Launched in 2008
specification:
length: 132 meters
Ship Width: 15 m
Draft: 5 meters
Displacement: standard 4500 tons full load

Dynamical systems: (CODAD) propulsion system, 4 SEMT Pielstick 16 PA6V-280 STC (domestic) diesel engine, dual-axis
Speed: 27
range: 5000 sea miles / 18knot
Weapons systems: a single-barrel 76mm guns, two Type-730 30mm close-in weapon systems (CIWs), four 8 unit HHQ-16 ship-to-air missile launchers, two quadruple YJ-8 anti-ship missile launchers (which can be Chang-ying optional anti-submarine missile), two 81-type anti-submarine 250mm rocket launchers, two rotary triple 324mm torpedo launchers, two 18-type multi-purpose 726-4 rocket launchers

a z-9C or k 28 helicopter
Electronic equipment: a MR-750MA (Top Plate-B) 3D air/surface search radar; a Type-346 (MR-36A) air / sea search radar; passive sonar system; 4 MR -90 (Front Dome) Fire Control Radar (ship-to-air missile); a Type-344 (MR-34) fire-control radar; an MR-331 (Band Stand) Fire Control Radar; GDG-775 Photoelectric director ; 2 Racal RM-1290 navigation radar; HZ-100 electronic warfare systems; MGK-335 medium frequency active/passive sonar system
ZKJ-4B/6 (developed from Thomson-CSF TAVITAC) combat data system
HN-900 Data link (Chinese equivalent of Link 11A/B, to be upgraded)


SNTI-240 SATCOM

Personnel : 190
East China Sea Fleet
Home port: in Zhoushan

naval Battle of Surigao Strait

The Japanese strategy in the defense of Leyte was to entrap the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet by its naval forces from the north in the Sibuyan Sea, and with assault from the south from Surigao Strait. Admiral Halsey and the U.S. Navy’s 3rd Fleet was to be lured northwards, away from the Leyte Strait by a decoy carrier force. The Japanese plan, named Sho-Go, called for the convergence of their two battleship forces from north and south onMacArthur’s landing beach, catching the U.S. troops and invasion ships in a pincers movement. To execute this strategy, the Imperial Japanese Navy formed four task forces under the overall command of Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, who himself was to lead the decoy carrier force with two battleships, three light cruisers and nine destroyers. The southern and weaker of these battleship forces, commanded by Rear Admiral Nishimura, would penetrate through Surigao Strait just south of Leyte, tying up the American battleships while the more powerful of the two battleship forces, the Central Force under the command of Vice Admiral Kurita, would penetrate through San Bernardino Strait, sail downthe coast of Samar, and fall on the American invasion fleet from the north-east. Admiral Shima with cruisers and destroyers acting as a second striking force would follow Nishimura into the Surigao Strait. The Battle of the Surigao Strait was one of the four engagements that made up the Battle of Leyte Gulf, which was the biggest naval battle fought in the Pacific Theatre during WWII.


The commander of the American ships facing Nishimura was Admiral Jesse Oldendorf. In his book Sea of Thunder, Evan Thomas describes Oldendorf as, “an unapologetic practitioner of the American war of war. He believed in massed firepower and overwhelming force.” It washis audacity, the use of the basic philosophies of war, and the use of the classic naval tactic of crossing the T that defeated the Japanese at Surigao Strait. This played a significant role in winning the Battle of Leyte Gulf and in so doing, helping to secure the beachheads of the U.S. Sixth Army on Leyte against Japanese attack from the sea. As Admiral Nishimura steamed toward the Surigao Strait he knew that his chances for victory were slim. From his flag ship the Yamashiro, he evaluated the force facing him and knew that the success of the Japanese depended on his commitment to the Sho-Go Plan. Hehad to tie up the American fleet committed to his destruction and spare Admiral Kurita’s Center Force. Nishimura counted on the battleships Fuso and the Yamashiro which had spent most of the war in Japan’s Inland Sea on training missions. At 0905 on 24 October, Nishimura's Force was sighted by aircraft from the Third Fleet carriers Enterprise and Franklin of Rear Admiral Davison's task group. Shima's Second Striking Force was located by a US Army Air Force bomber at 1155. The search/strike element from Davison's group which first located Nishimura attacked at 0918 and inflicted bomb hits on the flagship Yamashiro and on the destroyer Shigure, but these hits caused little damage and Nishimura continued his advance undeterred. Neither Nishimura nor Shima’s received any further air
attacks during daylight on 24 October since Admiral Halsey had transferred Admiral Davison's fast carrier group to the attack on Admiral Kurita's Centre Force, and the SeventhFleet's escort carriers were too busy with their duties around Leyte Gulf to be able to launch attacks on the Japanese forces. Admiral Kinkaid and his staff correctly surmised that the Japanese Southern Force would attempt to reach Leyte Gulf through Surigao Strait. Shortly after noon Kinkaid alerted every ship of the Seventh Fleet to prepare for a night action. Rear Admiral Oldendorf, commanding Kinkaid’s Bombardment and Fire Support Group, was ordered to the northern entrance of Surigao Strait with his very powerful force, and to prepare to meet the enemy ships. After Rear Admiral Oldendorf had formed his battle plan he called Rear Admirals Weyler, commanding the battle line, and Berkey, commander of the Right Flank cruisers and, destroyers aboard his flagship USS Louisville for a conference to discus the plan and to insure all commanders understood his intent.On the afternoon of 24 October, thirty-nine 7th Fleet torpedo-boats moved at high speed, through Leyte Gulf and Surigao Strait, into the Mindanao Sea south of Leyte, and by duskwere in position on their patrol-lines. As 7th Fleet had no night patrol aircraft, and the Third Fleet's night carrier Independence had been taken northwards with the rest of the Third Fleet to attack the Japanese Northern Force, Oldendorf was dependent on the motor-torpedo boats for advance warning of the Japanese approach. Nishimura, advancing towards Surigao Strait, at about 1830 received Kurita's signal that the latter's powerful Centre Force had been delayed by heavy air attacks in the Sibuyan Sea, which meant the Nishimura could not hope to be supported by Kurita in his attack on Leyte Gulf. As he approached Leyte, Nishimura sent Mogami and three destroyers ahead to reconnoiter. The PT boats' first contact was with the battleships rather than with the Mogami group though. At 2236 PT-131 of Section One off the island of Bohol made visual contact at a range of three miles, and shortly after were sighted by Shigure. At 2254 Nishimura ordered an emergency turn towards the boats and at 2256 the Japanese ships turned on their searchlights and opened fire. The boats attempted to close in for a torpedo attack but were driven off by the Japanese gunfire, two of them having been hit and damaged. PT-130 of Section One closed with the nearby Section Two and got PT-127 of the latter section to relay a contact report. This report reached Oldendorf at 0026 on October 25 and was the first concrete information of the enemy's position received by the Admiral since 1000 the previous morning. The heavy cruiser Mogami and her three accompanying destroyers got past Sections One and Two undetected.



At 2230 Nishimura radioed Kurita and Shima that he was advancing as scheduled while destroying enemy torpedo boats. At about 0400 Nishimura's heavy ships joined up again with the Mogami group, and at about 0100 his force assumed its line formation for the approach to Leyte Gulf. In the lead were two destroyers. Four kilometers behind them were the two battleships and the cruiser Mogami in line ahead, with a destroyer on each flank. The last action between the motor-torpedo boats and the Japanese force ended at 0213 on 25 October. As the battle between Nishimura and the PT boats was ending the battle between his force and the American destroyers was beginning. The first destroyer grouping to attack Nishimura was that of Captain Jesse Coward, who led three ships of Destroyer Squadron 54, the Remey, McGowan and Melvin, down the eastern side of the strait while two more, the McDermut and Monssen, hugged the western shore. Behind Coward followed six destroyers from Captain McManes’s Destroyer Squadron 24,steaming south in two sections: the Hutchens, the Daly, and the Bache were closest to the Leyte Island shore. The HMAS Arunta, an Australian destroyer assigned to the squadron, followed by the Killen and the Beale, cruised off their port quarter. Finally, Captain Smoot’snine-ship Destroyer Squadron 56 would attack in three columns. The Robinson, the Halford, and the Bryant would proceed down the eastern side. The Newcomb, the Richard P. Leary, and the Albert W. Grant would go down the middle of the strait, head-on, firing, then looping back. The Heywood L. Edwards, the Leutze, and the Bennion would attack on the
west site of the strait.

The Battle of Surigao Strait was effectively joined at 0200 on the 25th. In the ensuing night engagement and the pursuit that followed, the battleships YAMASHIRO and FUSO, heavy cruiser MOGAMI, and three of the four destroyers escorting them would all be sunk.

As Nishimura's force steamed filed up the center of the strait, the destroyers executed their battle plan firing salvos of torpedoes at ranges of about four miles, At 0319, Captain McManus commanding Destroyer Squadron 24 on the right flank, closed for the attack. Earlier, at 0254, as Captain Coward and Commander Phillips groups were dashing to the attack, Rear Admiral Berkey sent a radio message to Captain McManus with orders to divide into two groups and gave specific battle ingress and egress instructions. Captain McManus's pennant flew from USS Hutchins, a 2,100 ton destroyer that was the first of her class to be outfitted with a Combat Information Center (C.I.C.). This new C.I.C. provided a fused plot of gunnery, torpedo, and ship movement plot information that allowed the embarked commander (Captain McManus) the best possible presentation of the overall battle space in order to make decisions. In fact, Captain McManus, fought from C.I.C. vice the traditional location of the commander on the bridge of the ship. Destroyer Squadron 24 steamed south in two groups, the first consisting of USS Hutchins, USS Daly, and USS Bache, and the second consisted of H.M.A.S. Arunta, USS Killen, and USS Beale. The second section was commanded by Commander A. Buchanan of the Royal Australian Navy as OTC in H.M.A.S. Arunta. The previous mentioned explosion of Yamagumo, at 0320, at the hands of a torpedo from USS McDermut provided illumination for Commander Buchanan's attack. At 0323, H.M.A.S. Arunta fired four torpedoes at Shigure, leading the column, from a range of 6,500 yards - all missed. At 0325, USS Killen launched five torpedoes at Yamashiro at a range of 8,700 yards with one hit that slowed Yamashiro temporarily to 5 knots. Within 15 seconds, five more torpedoes were launched by USS Beale aimed at IJN Yamashiro - all missed. Captain McManus's section closed south at 25 knots to a point off of Amagusan Point, reversed his course and fired a spread of 15 torpedoes between 0329 and 0336, at ranges from 8,200 to 10,700 yards. Two minutes after sending his last message to Kurita, Nishimura's flagship YAMASHIRO suffered another blow. Beginning just after 0325, another wave of American destroyers had begun attacking the Japanese formation with torpedoes and gunfire. Some of their shells started a fire in YAMASHIRO's superstructure, but they were driven off by the battleship's 5.5" secondary battery. However, at 0340 MOGAMI's record states: "Direct torpedo hit observed on YAMASHIRO (apparently near the bow)." The next entry describes how MOGAMI herself was struck by shells in the same moment, and her No.3 turret disabled. At 0340, all three of Captain McManus's destroyers commenced gunfire on the retiring Michishio and Asagumo. From long range, Remey, McGowan and Melvin opened the battle with a salvo of 27 “fish”: Melvin was credited with sinking battleship Fuso. About ten minutes later, McDermut and Monssen scored from a different bearing: McDermut hitting destroyers Yamagumo, Michishio and Asagumo, sinking the first two; the IJN battleship Fuso blowing into two sections which drifted southward, the bow eventually sinking approximately 0420 and the stern within an hour. Captain McManus turned his destroyers to continue attacks on the fleeing ships that turned south, when Rear Admiral Berkey passed a radio message at 0349 ordering all Destroyer Squadron 24 ships to "knock it off" and retire. At 0350, while turning to retire, USS Hutchins fired another spread of five torpedoes in the direction of Asagumo. Asagumo had changed course and Michishio, badly damaged, drifted into the path of the torpedoes and at 0358 she took all five torpedoes squarely, blew up, and sank immediately. Rear Admiral Oldendorf then threw Captain Smoot and Destroyer Squadron 56 into the action. Splitting the squadron in three groups, Section 1 consisting of USS Albert W. Grant, USS Richard P. Leary, and USS Newcomb, under the command of Captain Smoot, while Section 2 was made up of, USS Bryant, USS Halford, and USS Robinson, under the command of Captain Conley, and finally Section 3, USS Bennion, USS Leutze, and USS Heywood L. Edwards, under the command of Commander Boulware. All three sections turned south in column and sped at 25 knots, assuming positions on the bow of the approaching ships. At 0345, Section 2 was spotted by enemy lookouts and Captain Conley's section came under fire. Between 0354 and 0359, Section 2 fired five torpedoes at ranges from 8,380 to 9,000 yards - all missed, and Section 2 retired in the vicinity of Hibuson Island. Section 3 closed and opened fire between 0357 and 0359 at ranges from 7,800 to 8,000 yards at targets of Shigure and Yamashiro. Both enemy ships made drastic turns to evade the approaching torpedoes - all torpedoes missed, and both enemy ships took Section 3 under fire. Section 3 was then retiring while making smoke and no enemy salvoes hit their targets. Section 3 retired toward Leyte and hugged the coastline heading north. Section 1 was bearing down the middle of the strait and having trouble deconflicting the radar picture. Yamashiro slowed and turned to the west and Captain Smoot ordered a starboard turn to parallel the battleships course. At 0404, Captain Smoot ordered torpedo launch, USS Richard P. Leary fired 3, USS Newcomb, and USS Albert W. Grant both fired five each at ranges approximately 6,200 yards from the target. Two large explosions were registered on Yamashiro at 30 seconds past 0411. Captain Smoot had already ordered retirement to the north as the main gunfire was already raining all around his ships from the battleships and cruisers on the battle line to the north. At 0407, while dashing north, destroyer USS Albert W. Grant came under heavy fire and, as she was hit, fired all remaining torpedoes squarely at the enemy. She would absorb 18 shells, 11 of which were 6 inch shells from friendly cruisers. At 0420, she lay dead in the water, 34 officers and enlisted men killed or missing and 94 wounded. USS Newcomb lashed herself to the disable destroyer and hauled her clear - she was repaired and would return to fight in the battle for Okinawa.



Three additional sections were still patrolling to the north, making east west runs northwest of Hibuson Island. The first section, stationed on the right flank, was Rear Admiral Berkey with the two light cruisers USS Boise, USS Phoenix, and H.M.A.S. Shropshire. Approximately six miles to Berkey's east was the group commanded by Rear Admiral Oldendorf of USS Louisville, USS Portland, USS Minneapolis, USS Denver, and USS Columbia. Still four miles further north was the main Battle Line, commanded by Rear Admiral Weyler, with the battleships USS Mississippi, USS California, USS Tennessee, USS West Virginia, USS Maryland, and USS Pennsylvania. At 0323, range to the approaching enemy ships was 33,000 yards, Admiral Weyler sent a radio message to the Battle Line ordering them to open fire when ranges were 26,000 yards. At 0351, Admiral Oldendorf ordered all cruisers of the Right Flank to open fire with USS Louisville ranging the targets at 15,600 yards. At 0353 the Battle Line added to the fire power bearing down on Yamashiro, Shigure, and Mogami. Vice Admiral Nishimura, from his flagship Yamashiro, would send a radio message to Fuso to make best speed, not knowing that Fuso had broken in two, was drifting south, and would sink within the hour. USS West Virginia, USS Tennessee, and USS California were all outfitted with the latest, cutting edge, fire control radar sets and would have fire control solutions passed to main battery plot long before the enemy came within range. At 0353, USS West Virginia would open fire raining down 93 rounds of 16 inch armor piercing projectiles before checking fire. Within two minutes, USS Tennessee and USS California opened concentrated fire in six gun salvoes and would fire 63 and 69 rounds respectively. The other three battleships had older fire control systems and would have trouble ranging the targets. USS Maryland, however, would fire 48 rounds commencing at 0359, walking her rounds on target using spotter information from splashes from USS West Virginia's fall of shot. USS Mississippi would fire but a single salvo on target information, and USS Pennsylvania never managed to get a fire control solution and wouldn't fire a single round. As the Battle Line turned to a westerly course, USS Mississippi fired a full salvo in the direction of the enemy - noted that they may have been clearing their main batteries at the moment when Rear Admiral Oldendorf had ordered Cease Fire. At 0351, the Left Flank cruiser USS Denver, opened fire and within a minute was followed by rounds from USS Minneapolis, USS Columbia, and USS Portland, all ships pouring gunfire on battleship Yamashiro. At 0358, USS Portland shifted fire to Mogami, who was attempting to retire south. At the same time, USS Denver, shifted fire to IJN Shigure, but probably was responsible for rounds that hit USS Albert W. Grant. USS Louisville also fired rounds at USS Albert W. Grant, but luckily missed. At 0353, USS Boise shifted firing rate to rapid and continuous on Yamashiro, while USS Phoenix fired 15 gun salvoes at quarter minute intervals on the same target. Rear Admiral Berkey then ordered USS Boise to slow her rate of fire in order to conserve ammunition. H.M.A.S. Shropshire was having trouble with her fire control system and didn't open up with 8 inch fire until 0356, and while the formation made their turn to a westerly course, shifted firing rate to rapid and continuous and was joined by the remaining formation cruisers at 0400. All three groups continued fire and as the allied groups closed range to each other and the enemy the rounds landed with increasing accuracy. Yamashiro had, at this point, changed course from north to west by south. Heavy cruiser ijn Mogami had turned south to retire, while destroyer Shigure sheered east near Hibuson Island and surprisingly only suffered one hit, an 8 inch shell that failed to explode. At 0409, Rear Admiral Oldendorf received the message that USS Albert W. Grant was taking friendly fire and radioed all ships to Cease Fire. At 0419, Yamashiro would capsize taking Vice Admiral Nishimura with her, at latitude 10 degrees 22.3 minutes north - longitude 125 degrees 21.3 minutes east. Heavy cruiser Mogami had taken an incredible number of hits and was making smoke and retiring south when, at 0402, a salvo from USS Portland exploded on her bridge killing her Commanding Officer, Captain R. Tooma, as well as her Executive Officer - she slowed to bare steerageway. Vice Admiral Shima's force of heavy cruisers Nachi, and Ashigara, light cruiser Abukuma, and destroyers Akebono, Ushio, Kasumi, Shiranuhi, Wakaba, Hatsushimo, and Hatsuharu entered the action at 0315, when passing through a rain squall, they were fired upon by PT-134 off of Binit Point, Panoan - all torpedoes missed their target. At 0320, Vice Admiral Shima ordered his formation east to clear Binit Point. At 0325, as the formation was still on their easterly course, Abukuma suffered a torpedo hit on her port side from PT-137. PT-137 was actually targeting a destroyer taking station in the rear of the formation, the torpedoes missed their intended target and slammed into Abukuma, killing 30 men and slowing the cruiser to 10 knots. Vice Admiral Shima then turned his disposition north, and at 0410 encountered the burning hulk of Fuso in two pieces. Vice Admiral Shima's force detected targets to the northeast and prepared for torpedo attack, firing at 0424 at a range of 9,000 yards - all torpedoes missed their targets and two torpedoes were later recovered after beaching on Hibuson Island. At 0425, Vice Admiral Shima recalled his force and turned south, passing a radio message Vice Admiral Mikawa informing him of the conclusion of present action and retirement for planning of further attacks. While transiting south, heavy cruiser Nachi encountered the disabled Mogami and believed her to be dead in the water and, in an inexplicable display of poor seamanship, failed to avoid her and both cruisers collided at 0430. Mogami would fall into the column heading south and run afoul of Motor Torpedo Boat Section 11, attacking and causing slight damage to PT-321.



Post-battle Pursuit



At 0433, Rear Admiral Oldendorf ordered dashed in pursuit with USS Louisville down the middle of the strait screened by Destroyer Squadron 56, followed by the remainder of the Left Flank cruisers in column. He then ordered the Right Flank cruisers to start south along the Leyte coastline and detached the Battle Line screen of Division X-ray to take up pursuit duties. At 0535, X-ray caught up with the Left Flank cruisers and were ordered to join their formation. At a few minutes after 0500, USS Louisville detected enemy ships again heading north in the vicinity of Amagusan Point, but within a few minutes Vice Admiral Shima changed course again south and continued retirement. At 0520, Rear Admiral Oldendorf's cruisers were eight miles off of Eschonchada Point and he swung the formation to 250 degrees and verified that the one contact he had on radar was indeed the enemy. Mogami was the target and she came under intense fire from USS Louisville, USS Portland, and USS Denver. Rear Admiral Oldendorf turned his cruisers north at 0537 to reconcentrate his force to the north leaving Mogami to burn. Mogami would again come under attack at 0600, this time from PT-491 firing two torpedoes - both missed, Mogami countering with a valiant barrage of 8 inch gunfire. Vice Admiral Shima's column was detected by PT-190 at 0630, but chased away by destroyers took refuge by making smoke and escaped into Sogod Bay. Vice Admiral Shima ordered his disposition to close Mindanao and made for 16 knots cruising speed to avoid further encounters with the Motor Torpedo Boat sections. At 0645, Mogami again found a PT boat, this time PT-137 who gave chase but due to the heavy cruisers high speed, secondary battery gunfire, and a screening destroyer, was forced to retire. Rear Admiral Oldendorf had again turned south at 0643, directing Rear Admiral Hayler to take his two light cruisers and three destroyers and neutralize any remaining disabled enemy ships he could find. Cruisers USS Denver and USS Columbia joined gunfire from USS Cony and USS Sigourney, from Division X-ray, on Asagumo - all five opening fire at 0707. Asagumo was badly damaged by Destroyer Squadron 54, blowing Asagumo's bow off. She continued firing from her aft gun mount, her last salvo fired as the stern went down at 0721 halfway between Tungo Point, Dinagat and Caligangan Point, Panaon. At 0845, Rear Admiral Sprague's carrier launched Avengers found Vice Admiral Shima's fleeing force and swooped in for attack on Mogami and at 0910 left her dead in the water. Destroyer Akebono took off Mogami's crew, but met the same fate at 1230 by the hand of a torpedo attack. Cruiser Abukuma and destroyer Ushio would put in at Dapitan on the northwest point of Mindanao, upon leaving port on the morning of 26 October, at 1006 were attacked 44 B-24's and B-25's of the V and XIII Army Air Force and Abukuma sunk near Negros at 1242. Nachi proceeded to Manila Bay and would be sunk by Helldivers and Avengers from USS Lexington on November 5, 1944. Thus the only units to escape were Ashigara, and five destroyers.

battleship action in the naval battle of Guadalcanal

the Guadalcanal campaign (August 1942 - February 1943) that the Americans began to retake territory and put the Japanese on the defensive.

The bitter fighting on that island is legendary. However, there was also a series of naval actions off Guadalcanal that played a crucial role in the campaign. These were not what is commonly thought of as the typical World War II naval action. Air power only played a supporting part. The actions centered upon fierce night surface actions in confined waters. The decisive naval actions of the campaign took place during the period 12 November to 15 November 1941.

the battleship action. It was not until the battleship action that Japanese hopes of retaking the island were ended. Moreover, the battleship action was a desperate gamble that involved risking the last heavy surface force in the Pacific in a way that was contrary to established doctrine and in a type of fighting that the Japanese had shown themselves to be masters.

USS WASHINGTON had only entered the Pacific for the first time in late August. She was the second of the NORTH CAROLINA class, the first class of fast battleships. WASHINGTON had been commissioned in May 1941. Her first assignment when the war began was to escort the supply convoys from Britain to Murmansk, Russia, in case the German battleship TIRPITZ should emerge from her lair in the Norwegian fjords. Since arriving in the South Pacific, she had largely been assigned missions independent of the carrier task forces and had not seen much action.

A USS WASHINGTON (BB 56)

DISPLACEMENT: 41,000

full load tons

LENGTH: 729 feet BEAM: 108 feet

SPEED: 28 knots POWER

PLANT: Steam turbine

ARMAMENT: Nine 16 inch 45 caliber: Twenty 5 inch 38 caliber; Sixty 40mm; Thirty-six 20mm CREW: 1,880 COMMISSIONED: 15 May 1941 DECOMMISSIONED: 27 June 1947



The Campaign uadalcanal is the largest island in the Solomons chain. It lies south of the equator in the Coral Sea, southeast of New Guinea and northeast of Australia. The Solomons are arranged in a loose column of twos heading northwest from Guadalcanal toward Rabaul. The water lying between the columns was nicknamed "The Slot" by the Americans who fought in the Solomons campaign. At the Guadalcanal end of The Slot is another body of water with an American nickname. It is bounded by Guadalcanal on the south, Savo Island on the west, and Tulagi and Florida islands to the north. The name for it is "Ironbottom Sound."

In July 1942, aerial reconnaissance detected that the Japanese were constructing an airfield on Guadalcanal. This information required immediate action because when the airfield was completed it would pose a threat to the line of communication between the United States and Australia. Moreover, it could be used to launch a new thrust towards Port Moseby, New Guinea - - the objective the Japanese had been prevented from taking in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Although the bulk of American resources was being sent to the European Theater, an amphibious assault force was quickly scraped together and on 7 August 1942, the First Marine Division was landed on Guadalcanal and Marine Raiders on Tulagi where the Japanese had built a seaplane base. The Marines captured the Guadalcanal airfield the next day, renaming it Henderson Field after a Marine flyer killed at Midway. Then, things started to go bad. Upon hearing of the invasion, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, IJN, led a force of cruisers and destroyers from the large Japanese base at Rabaul down The Slot to attack the American ships supporting the invasion. His force entered Ironbottom Sound shortly after midnight achieving complete surprise. Four Allied heavy cruisers and a destroyer were sunk and another heavy cruiser and two destroyers damaged. However, concerned that his force might be attacked by carrier-based aircraft if it was still off Guadalcanal when daylight broke, Mikawa decided to return to base without attacking the defenseless transports unloading at the beachhead.

The Battle of Savo Island was thus a humiliating defeat but at least it was not a complete disaster. Ironically, Mikawa need not have worried. Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, USN, had withdrawn the three aircraft carriers that had covered the landings on the grounds that his fighter strength had been greatly reduced as a result of operations and that his ships were starting to run low on fuel. Since after the Savo debacle there was practically nothing left to defend the transports, they were withdrawn on 9 August after unloading only half their cargoes. Consequently, the Marines were left holding a small area around the airfield with very little supplies. Using captured Japanese construction equipment, the Marines finished the airfield in early September and an assortment of Marine, Army, and Navy aircraft were flown in. "The Cactus Air Force," named for the code name for Guadalcanal, gave the Americans air superiority. However, the campaign stalemated. Each side funneled in reinforcements, the Americans by freighter during daylight, the Japanese by the "Tokyo Express" - - primarily destroyers that would speed down The Slot at night bringing supplies and reinforcements. Still, despite heavy fighting, the Americans (including Army troops landed in October) could not advance and the Japanese could not retake the airfield. Meanwhile, offshore, the fighting was similarly intense.

On 24 August, a force built around USS SARATOGA (CV 3), USS ENTERPRISE (CV 6), and USS NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55) engaged a force centered around three Japanese carriers and sank the carrier RYUJO. Shortly after the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, SARATOGA was torpedoed by a submarine and rendered out of action for three months. USS WASP (CV 7) was not as lucky. She was torpedoed and sunk while escorting a group of transports to Guadalcanal. NORTH CAROLINA was also put out of action by a torpedo in the same engagement. On the night of 11 October, a force of cruisers and destroyers under the command of RADM Norman Scott, USN, intercepted two Japanese cruisers and two destroyers, which were on the way to bombard Henderson Field. In the Battle of Cape Esperance, one Japanese cruiser was sunk and the other badly damaged at the cost of one destroyer sunk, and a light cruiser and a destroyer damaged.



Two nights later, however, the battleships IJN KONGO and HARUNA appeared in Ironbottom Sound and bombarded Henderson Field destroying 48 aircraft. Although determined attacks by PT boats made the battleships so nervous that they went away, cruisers carried on the bombardment the next two nights. Another carrier engagement took place on 26-27 October, when USS ENTERPRISE and USS HORNET (CV 8) encountered four carriers sent to cover a major land offensive directed at retaking Henderson Field. Two Japanese carriers were knocked out of commission but HORNET was sunk in the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands. This left the damaged ENTERPRISE as the only operational carrier in the Pacific. The Barroom Brawl y early November, the Japanese realized that two conditions had to be met in order to win on Guadalcanal. First, the Japanese had to significantly outnumber the Americans on the ground. This would require a large-scale reinforcement of the garrison. Second, Henderson Field had to be neutralized so as to give the Japanese control of the air and the seas. The Cactus Air Force was shooting down Japanese planes at a ratio of 10 to one. Accordingly, between 2 November and 10 November, 65 destroyer loads of troops landed on the island tipping the scale so that the Japanese outnumbered the Americans for the first time. Furthermore, on 11 November, the Japanese assembled eleven transports loaded with 13,500 troops and supplies. This convoy would be supported by a battle group centered upon the battleships IJN HIEI and IJN KIRISHIMA. In addition to escorting the convoy, this force was to bombard Henderson Field into rubble. American intelligence got wind of the apanese plan and Vice Admiral William Halsey, USN, who had replaced Vice Admiral R. Ghormley, USN, as South Pacific Commander, dispatched ENTERPRISE screened by USS WASHINGTON (BB 56) and USS SOUTH DAKOTA (BB 57) as well as by two cruisers and eight destroyers to counter the Japanese attack. Since uss ENTERPRISE was still under repair in Nouema, Halsey ordered that the two battleships and half the destroyers to proceed ahead if the carrier could not make the battle zone in time. Meanwhile, two American convoys reached Guadalcanal. The first was escorted by the antiaircraft cruiser USS ATLANTA (CL 51) and four destroyers under Admiral Scott while the second was escorted by the heavy cruiser USS SAN FRANCISCO (CA 38), three other cruisers, and five destroyers under Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan, USN. When coastwatchers and aircraft reported a large force of two battleships, a light cruiser, and 14 destroyers moving down The Slot, the Americans realized that the relief force would not arrive in time and that defending the island was up to the convoy escort ships.

After thwarting an attack on the transports by Japanese bombers on the afternoon of 12 November, Callaghan took the transports to sea. After dark, the escort ships broke away from the transports and formed into a line of battle to wait for the Japanese in Ironbottom Sound. Unfortunately, Callaghan had little experience with radar and put the ships with the best radar, USS FLETCHER (DD 455) at the end of the column. Compounding this error, he kept his flag on USS SAN FRANCISCO, which had a relatively poor communications suite. Nor did he inform the other ships of his battle plan. The Japanese bombardment group was not expecting a naval battle as it entered Ironbottom Sound in the moonless early hours of 13 November, assuming that the American warships had departed the area at sunset. As a result, the two forces virtually crashed into each other. At almost point blank range, the ships began firing shells and torpedoes. Japanese searchlights illuminated American ships. Tracers and star shells lit the night. A series of confusing orders emanated from the American flagship including directions to cease fire, fire at the "big ones," and that odd numbered ships should fire to port and even numbered ships fire to starboard - - failing to take into account the actual position of the various ships in relation to the enemy. Friendly fire smashed into nearby ships in the general confusion. A destroyer came so close to a battleship that the battlewagon was unable to depress its main battery to fire. However, the destroyer's torpedoes were unable to arm before hitting the battleship. Machine gunners raked the battleship‘s bridge but a 14 inch shell caused the destroyer to disappear as she attempted to escape. In a half hour it was all over. Callaghan and Scott were dead. All of the American cruisers were heavily damaged and incapable of further fighting. USS ATLANTA would sink the next day. Four destroyers had sunk and a fifth was heavily damaged. However, IJN HIEI was badly damaged and was limping slowly home. Two Japanese destroyers were sunk and two others badly damaged. Most importantly, the bombardment group had turned back without destroying Henderson Field. However, the Americans knew that the Japanese would return. In daylight, aircraft from Henderson Field, found IJN HIEI crawling up The Slot and finished her. But the Japanese struck back. A submarine sank USS JUNEAU (CL 52) and two heavy cruisers bombarded Henderson Field just after midnight destroying 18 planes and damaging 32 others. Still, the field was operational. On the following morning (14 November), airmen from Henderson Field and ENTERPRISE, now some 200 miles from Guadalcanal, and B-17s from Espiritu Santo, found the transport convoy and managed to sink six transports. But even this was not enough to stop the attack. The Japanese loaded the survivors from the sinking transports onto destroyers. The remaining transports eventually were able to beach themselves on Guadalcanal and disembark their troops. Meanwhile, at Rabaul, a new heavy bombardment group, including KIRISHIMA, two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers, was placed under the command of Vice Admiral Nouburke Kon do, IJN, and given the task of neutralizing Henderson Field. The raid was planned for late on the night of 14 November.

The Big Guns‘ Turn oncern that the only operational carrier in the Pacific was in a vulnerable position led Halsey to order the ENTERPRISE task force to return to Nouema. Most of the aircraft had already flown off to operate out of Henderson Field. Most importantly, Halsey recognized that the cruiser/destroyer action had only delayed the Japanese, not stopped them. Accordingly, on 13 November, battleship WASHINGTON, SOUTH DAKOTA, and four destroyers were detached under the command of Rear Admiral Willis —Ching“ Lee Jr., USN, and ordered to proceed at —best speed“ to Guadalcanal. However, even at top speed, they would not arrive until the morning of 14 November. Lee‘s assignment was contrary to established doctrine. Battleships were not supposed to be used in confined waters such as Ironbottom Sound. Moreover, the force had never operated together as a group. The four destroyers were of different classes and different divisions and were selected because they were the ones in the ENTERPRISE Task Force with the most fuel. Neither had battleships WASHINGTON and USS SOUTH DAKOTA operated together except as parts of the ENTERPRISE screen.

Admiral Lee, who was a gunnery expert, however, required his flagship to maintain a rigorous schedule of gunnery practice. SOUTH DAKOTA was the name-ship of the second class of fast battleships. Designed in the late 1930s when the United States was still trying to live within the requirements of the London Naval Treaty, she attempted to remedy the perceived shortcomings of the NORTH CAROLINAs in a shorter and more compact hull. Commissioned in March 1942, she had run aground shortly after entering the Pacific in August. This was a blessing in disguise since when she went to Pearl Harbor for repairs, her antiaircraft battery was improved with new 40mm and 20mm guns. These showed their worth during the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands when she shot down 26 enemy aircraft that were attacking ENTERPRISE, thus saving that carrier from the same fate as HORNET. However, after a collision with a destroyer, sailors were saying SOUTH DAKOTA was jinxed. Informed by radio of the air battle against the transports, Lee decided not to risk his ships in confined water during daylight. As a result, it was not until 2100 on 14 November that the WASHINGTON task force entered Ironbottom Sound. Lee had arranged the ships in a column with the destroyers USS WALKE (DD 416), USS BENHAM (DD 397), USS PRESTON (DD 377), and USS GWIN (DD 433), in the lead, followed 5,000 yards later by WASHINGTON and then another 1,000 yards by SOUTH DAKOTA. While Lee knew that the Japanese were more experienced than his force, —we entered the action confident that we could outshoot the enemy.“ At the same time, Kondo was approaching down The Slot. His force was divided into two groups: the main body consisting of KIRISHIMA, and the heavy cruisers ATAGO and TAKAO; a screening group composed of the light cruiser NAGURA, and six destroyers; and the sweeping group, light cruiser SENDAI and three destroyers, which was to comb the waters for American ships. WASHINGTON picked up radio traffic from American PT boats indicating that they had two —big ones“ in sight and were about to attack. Lee took the microphone and tried to convince Guadalcanal that the PT boats were about to attack American ships. When they refused to believe him because he did not know the proper code, Lee bet that Maj. Gen Alexander Vandergrift, USMC, commanding general on Guadalcanal, might remember his nick name at the Naval Academy and told the skeptical radio operator: —This is Ching Chong China Lee! Chinese catchee? Refer your boss about Ching Lee. Call off your boys!“ The PT boats, which had been listening to this exchange, responded: —Identity established. We are not after you.“ Near midnight, WASHINGTON detected targets on her radar. A few minutes later, the main battery was firing at SENDAI while the secondary battery targeted destroyer AYANAMI. Joined by fire from SOUTH DAKOTA, the fire from the secondary battery sank the Japanese destroyer. Japanese lookouts reported four American destroyers and two battleships. Kondo dismissed these reports.

The Americans had no battleships. The large ships must be cruisers. He was not going to let such a force distract him from his main mission of neutralizing Henderson Field. The screening force would engage the Americans. Meanwhile, the American destroyers raced forward to attack the Japanese screening force. However, searchlights illuminated PRESTON and within minutes s the crew was abandoning the burning wreck. WALKE was hit by a torpedo and exploded. Another torpedo blew off a portion of BENHAM‘s bow but she continued to shoot. GWIN was hit by a shell in the engine room that caused a series of explosions. Within minutes, all four American destroyers were effectively out of the action. But, the destroyers had broken up the Japanese formation and absorbed torpedoes which otherwise would have been fired at the battleships. —It was beyond admiration,“ Lee wrote later, —and it probably saved our bacon.“ SOUTH DAKOTA had a history of electrical problems and to avoid such a problem now, the chief engineer tied down the circuit breakers. Unfortunately, this put the system into series and the ship lost all electrical power. Guns, radar, communications, turret motors were all gone. Attempts to restore power were only temporarily effective as the battleship continued to have power failures throughout the engagement. Ahead of the battleships were the burning remains of WALKE and PRESTON. In order not to be silhouetted by the fires, the officer of the deck Lt. Ray Hunter, USN, ordered WASHINGTON to turn to the left so that the burning destroyers would be between the battleships and the enemy. SOUTH DAKOTA, however, did not follow. Instead, either because of her electrical problems or to avoid a collision with BENHAM, she continued on the original course. WASHINGTON proceeded into the darkness. Since GWIN and BENHAM were badly damaged, Lee ordered them to retire. Passing the survivors of the sunken destroyers, WASHINGTON jettisoned her life rafts into the water. The destroyer sailors cheered and called out —Get after them WASHINGTON!“ The flagship upon her SG radar to maneuver and locate enemy ships in the darkness. However, a problem emerged when SOUTH DAKOTA failed to follow WASHINGTON‘s course change. When the radar had been installed at the Brooklyn Navy Yard earlier in the year, there had been a heated argument about where the radar antenna should be placed. The ship‘s gunnery officers had argued for placing it on top of the mast so as to give a full 360 degree view. The designers argued that a more secure location would be slightly lower. Although that location left an 80 degree blind spot to aft, the designers won out. Now, the radar gave a good reading on a large target. It was probably one of the heavy cruisers or KIRISHIMA.

However, Lee refused to give permission to open fire. He had heard nothing from SOUTH DAKOTA. The large target could be Japanese or it might be SOUTH DAKOTA. With the blind spot in the radar, Lee did not have a full view of the battlefield. On board SOUTH DAKOTA, everything was going wrong. She was now between the burning destroyers and the Japanese and thus silhouetted against the flames. As a result, searchlights first from the screening force and then from the main body found her and she was took hit after hit. Her superstructure was heavily damaged, her radar plot, radio communications, and five of six fire control radars were out of action, and she was leaking oil. When she attempted to reply, a salvo from her number three main battery set fire to one of the float planes on her stern catapults. Luckily, a second salvo blew the plane overboard and the crew put out the flames. It took some time to convince him but Kondo eventually realized that he was not fighting a cruiser. Rather, this was one of America‘s latest class of battleships, embodying the best of American technology. It would be an honor to sink such an adversary. But, in the excitement, did he remember that the lookouts had reported that there were two large American ships? Suddenly, battleship KIRISHIMA shook as shells from WASHINGTON‘s main battery tore into her. In the moonless darkness, WASHINGTON had come up on IJN KIRISHIMA‘s other side. When the Japanese battleship illuminated SOUTH DAKOTA, Lee knew who was where. —Their searchlights provided excellent illumination of SOUTH DAKOTA, but attracted our fire and provided a point of aim.“ With WASHINGTON‘s 16 inch guns depressed to minimum elevation, she fired some 75 16 inch shells and 107 five inch shells at the enemy battleship. —Salvos were walked back and forth across the target.“ A false report that the target was sunk, caused WASHINGTON to cease fire. This gave KIRISHIMA time to turn her guns on WASHINGTON. The two ships then traded salvos but the Japanese were unable to find their mark. In a few minutes, KIRISHIMA, glowing cherry red, was out of commission and had to be abandoned. WASHINGTON‘s appearance diverted the Japanese fleet from their pummeling of SOUTH DAKOTA.

According to Washington‘s Action Report: —From 0100 to 0107, fired 120 rounds 5“, at ranges from 7,400 to 9,500 yards, in succession at three enemy cruisers illuminating and engaging SOUTH DAKOTA and also under fire by her; they were silenced.“ As the enemy searchlights swung round to locate the ship that was firing out of the darkness, SOUTH DAKOTA decided it was time to make an exit. With her electricity partially restored, SOUTH DAKOTA limped into the darkness. SOUTH DAKOTA‘s departure left WASHINGTON engaging six ships single-handed. (Three destroyers had been assigned to rescue survivors from KIRISHIMA). As WASHINGTON headed north along the coast of Savo, the remaining Japanese ships gave chase. However, discouraged by WASHINGTON‘s heavy fire, the Japanese withdrew under cover of a smoke screen. As they did, they fired a series of torpedoes. WASHINGTON maneuvered and the torpedoes exploded in her wake.



Kondo had lost his largest ship and his cruisers were damaged. It was impossible to proceed further and attack Henderson Field. Accordingly, he signaled his disorganized force to retreat back up The Slot. The next morning, WASHINGTON met SOUTH DAKOTA at a prearranged rendezvous. Having sustained 42 hits, SOUTH DAKOTA was badly damaged and would have to return to the U.S. for repairs. WASHINGTON, amazingly, had sustained no casualties and the only damage was a hole in one of the radar antennas. BENHAM had had to be abandoned and was sunk by gunfire from GWIN. With the survivors from BENHAM, GWIN proceeded to Espiritu Santo. PT boats and a destroyer rescued 266 survivors from WALKE and PRESTON. The battleship action of 14-15 November put an end to Japanese hopes of driving the Americans from Guadalcanal. They had been thwarted in their attempts to neutralize Henderson Field and although some reinforcements were able to land, they did so without supplies and, in some cases, without their rifles. There would be other surface engagements in the waters off Guadalcanal but they would be in connection with Japanese attempts to evacuate the island. The Marines and the Army would encounter fierce resistance until February 1943 but that fighting would be in connection with taking the remainder of the island rather than defending the small area around Henderson Field that the Marines had held since August. If the battleships had failed, it is difficult to see how the United States could have won the Guadalcanal campaign. With Henderson Field destroyed and the waters around Guadalcanal swept of all Allied combatants larger than a PT boat, the Japanese would have had control of the air and the sea. No supplies or reinforcements could reach the beleaguered soldiers and Marines on the island. In contrast, the Japanese would have been able to supply and reinforce at will. Moreover, there was nothing left in the Pacific to stop them. Thus, the pivotal nature of the battleship action is clear. Admiral Chester Nimitz, USN, wrote: —The success or failure in recapturing Guadalcanal, and the vital naval battle related to it, is the fork in the road that leads to victory.“

ww2 Liberty ship Specifications

Liberty ship layout
The SS John W. Brown is a World War II cargo ship built by the U.S. Maritime Commission. In 1942, she was built in 41 days at the Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard in Baltimore, Maryland. She was launched on Labor Day, September 7, 1942. The ship was named after an American labor leader who organized workers in shipyards.After being launched, the ship sailed to New York and departed on its maiden voyage on September 29, 1942 carrying supplies to the Middle East. In 1943, the ship was converted to carry troops as well as cargo. Later, the John W. Brown supported combat operations in the Mediterranean Sea. The ship was involved in the Allied landings at Sicily and Anzio in Italy, and southern France. After the war ended in Europe, the John W. Brown carried U.S. military personnel home.About 2,700 Liberty ships were made during the war, and about 200 were sunk. Where possible, bulky war machines, (like cargo ships that required much raw material)--were made in the U.S.; allowing England’s labor force to concentrate more on labor intensive, smaller, technical machines (like their fine Spitfire fighter planes, and mine detecting and destruction equipment, and so on).


Liberty ship model

LIBERTY SHIP: It became obvious, after WW2 began, that the Allies’ mounting loss of ships, to enemy subs (U-boats) was a major obstacle to the Allied effort; and, in fact, England might starve. And Soviet Russia’s manufacturing capacity and resources were also soon greatly reduced by initial German territorial gains. And the Soviets lost their labor force in areas occupied by Germany. So an astute U.S. Administration, with good advisors and technical experts, drafted plans to manufacture great numbers of Merchant ships, using cheap, non-scarce materials, and high-efficiency technology. And the ships were to have great cargo capacity. Welding would replace rivets; large prefab sectionswould be utilized where possible.
The value of the cargo carried by a Liberty ship often far exceeded the value of the Liberty ship, itself. If such ship could just make only one successful delivery to the Allies, it thus “paid for itself”. Suppose, a Liberty ship carried 440 tanks weighing 8000 tons total and worth $18,000,000. That value would obviously dwarf the $1,600,000 cost of the ship, itself. In fact, that is a strong argument for dispersing especially valuable cargo among various Liberty ships, so that an Ally receiving it does not find itself totally lacking in any one class of equipment, indispensable for carrying on the war. (Occasionally there were “too many of a particular type of ‘eggs put in one basket’, i.e., loaded on one Liberty ship”.) Incidentally, a ship’s steam engine is designed to re-condense, recover, and recycle its de-energized warm steam, after each cycling sequence. And therefore, it need not make water stops or scoop up cool water for its engines; which railroad steam locomotives, unfortunately, have to do. (Large WW2 Warships, propelled by steam turbines, produced and utilized high steam pressures of 575 psi., which seems much higher than steamlocomotives of the period, i.e., 250 psi.)

The ships’ shape, propulsion, and general design were based on a cheap, old “tramp” ship that had been commercially successful.I think it was fortunate, at least, that fuel oil was chosen, instead of coal to power Liberty ships, because that required much less crew, who might be killed or injured if the ship was torpedoed. And the U.S. Merchant Marine Service suffered a higher percent killed than any the large ‘military’ Branch of the Services; and did not need matters made still worse. (Of course, certain specialty services within each major Service, such as the U.S. Submariners, suffered even higher percentage killed.) Oil fuel also increased the Liberty Ship’s efficiency. In 1940, about 40% of the world’s ships still used coal. Coal was much more commonly used in merchant ships, then; and was generally avoided for military ship propulsion. It was decided that Liberty ships would used cheap and relatively available engines, ((i.e., the triple expansion, reciprocating steam engines--even though their relatively low power output (totaling 2,500 HP) propelled the large ships slowly enough to be followed for a while, even by submerged U-boats.)

Liberty Ship Technical Specifications

Speed: 10.5 knots (12 mph), presumably even when fully loaded.
Gross weight (i.e., weight of empty ship): 7000 tons
Cargo weight (applicable to ship’s “full load displacement” rating):7000 tons
Full load” Displacement (Gross weight + full-load cargo weight):14,000 tons
The so-called “Deadweight” (i.e., amount of Cargo, and the ship’s own Fuel, etc., which the ship could carry on emergency missions if seas didn’t become too rough, or in calm lakes, etc.): …… 10,500 tons
Size:430 feet long; 57 feet beam (max width); 27 feet draft (depth into the water).
Power: total 2,500HP, from reciprocating steam engines.
Fuel: Oil
Crew: about 56 to 80; ((about 12 to 25 of those would likely be Navy personnel (guards) to man the ship’s several defensive guns. The number of these guns per ship increased during the war))

USS Freedom lcs1 waterjet propulsion

USS Freedom (LCS 1) is the first US Navy Littoral Combat Ship in an entirely new class of Navy surface warships. The ship is designed for littoral, or close-to-shore, operations and to provide access and dominance in coastal-water areas.

The Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) will employ waterjets.waterjets have not been used on larger ships until recently. There are many advantages of waterjets. The most prominent advantage is the shallow draft of the system. Waterjets do not have appendages (such as propellers, shafts and struts, or rud- ders) that extend below the waterline. This minimizes the risk of damaging the propulsion gear from grounding or from hitting a submerged object, and it also reduces the maintenance require- ments. As a result the boats can operate close to the shoreline, land on a beach for deployment of troops or equipment, or even run over submerged logs or sandbars without damaging the propulsion equipment.They present some clear advantages for warships. Waterjets deliver rapid acceleration and can sustain high speeds. Waterjet-powered ships are extremely maneuverable and can stop quickly. They offer simplicity. The flow is constant in a single direction. Engine loading is constant, regardless of vessel speed, and waterjets do not overload the engines. There may be no need for a gearbox. Astern propulsion is applied by means of deflectors that TDert the jetstream for- ward. Precise station keeping can be maintained with waterjets. Waterjets were chosen for LCS to provide high speeds in shallow waters, where the LCS will operate to combat asymmetric anti- access threats in the littoral regions of the world. Two variants of LCS are being built. Lockheed Martin has delivered the USS Freedom, a semi-planing monohull design built at Marinette Marine in Wisconsin. General Dynamics is building a trimaran, the USS Independence, at Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama. Both will have diesels and gas turbines, and both will employ waterjets. The General Dynamics LCS has four steering and reversing waterjets, while the Lockheed Martin LCS has two steering and reversing and two booster jets. Both ships displace about 3,000 tons and up to 4,000 tons fully loaded. This will make the two LCS combatants the largest naval water- jet-powered warships. While the two versions have taken different naval architectur- al approaches to the mission, both “seaframes” will carry mission modules that can be reconfigured to adapt to each ship’s combat mission assignment. USS Freedom is powered by two Rolls-Royce MT30 36 MW gas turbines and two Fairbanks Morse Colt-Pielstick 16PA6B STC diesels. The seaframe is based on the Fincantieri-built, Donald Blount-designed high-speed yacht Destriero, which holds the record for the fastest transatlantic crossing (60 knots). The 378-foot Freedom has a steel hull with aluminum super- structure. The two 36 MW gas turbines and two diesel engines power four large Rolls-Royce Kamewa waterjets. Four Isotta Fraschini Model V1708 ship service diesel generator sets provide auxiliary power. USS Independence, the slender stabilized trimaran monohull built by the General Dynamics team, has an overall length of 418 feet, maximum beam of 93 feet, and full load displacement of 2,637 tons. The seaframe is based on Austal’s design for the Benchijigua Express passenger and car ferry. Two General Electric LM2500 22 MW gas turbines and two MTU 20V8000M90 9100 kW diesel engines are the prime movers, powering four large steering and reversing Wärtsilä-Lips 2 X LJ160E and 2 X LJ150E waterjets. With all propulsion flat out, the Wärtsilä-Lips waterjets together expel roughly 27,000 gal- lons of seawater per second exiting from the jet nozzles at a speed around 90 mph. The trimaran variant built by General Dynamics will also have a retractable azimuth thruster. CONCLUSION One design is not optimum for all situations. Cruise ships with large portions of their itineraries at low power benefit from elec- tric drive. Fast ferries, which go to full throttle as soon as they clear the breakwater and remain at full throttle until they reach the next port, would be at a disadvantage with electric drive. There are advantages to a mechanical drive system. Mechanical drive systems are more efficient compared to electric drive sys- tems in terms of their ability to transmit energy from the prime mover to the propulsor.

DDG 1000 Zumwalt destroyer electric propulsion

electric propulsion

Zumwalt-class destroyer DDG 1000, a new class of multi-mission US Navy surface combatant ship designed to operate as part of a joint maritime fleet, assisting Marine strike forces ashore as well as performing littoral, air and sub-surface warfare.

The DDG 1000 will be powered by Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines, which is based upon the Rolls-Royce “Trent” engine that powers the Boeing 777 airliner. The aviation version of the engine has a demonstrated reliability of 99.98%. The ‘marinized’ version of the MT30 has 80% commonality with the Trent 800 but is shock-mounted and has different blade coatings for operation in a saltwater environment. This engine is also serving today aboard the new Littoral Combat Ship USS Freedom (LCS 1). Zumwalt will also have a smaller gas turbine, the Rolls-Royce 4500. DDG 1000 power generators produce 4,160 volts alternating current (AC), which is rectified to direct current (DC) that allows ship service power distribution to be tailored to the ship’s needs. There are three primary advantages to DC. First, DC uses solid state power conversion that supplies loads which are con- verted back to AC and is a cleaner way to supply power. Secondly, many of the combat systems’ loads are DC. Finally, it enables power to be shared and auctioned. DC enables uninter- rupted power even in the occurrence of a casualty. The DDG 1000 will employ fixed pitch propellers. Controllable pitch propellers and their associated complex hydraulics are not required since the motor, and thus the shaft, can be electrically reversed. But novel approaches to propulsion are being considered for future combatants. Other new naval ships are also adopting integrated electric power systems. The next-generation CVN 21 aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald Ford , will have a newly designed nuclear power plant and all-electric systems and propulsion. The next amphibious assault ship, the USS Makin Island (LHA 6), will feature a combined gas turbine and electric propulsion system. The surface combatant IPS propulsion engineering develop- ment model (EDM) for DDG 1000 is being tested at the Land- Based Test Site (LBTS) at the Ships Systems Engineering Station in Philadelphia. The test site has been used to evaluate different configurations and motors. The test program validates key system metrics such as torque, speed and power output, and specific fuel consumption for the various configurations. The Navy has tested the 18-megawatt (MW) advanced induc- tion motor (AIM), which will be the baseline for DDG 1000, produced by Alstom at the LBTS. This is essentially the same system installed on the Royal Navy’s new Type 45 destroyer, the HMS Daring, which has just been commissioned. The IPS features Integrated Fight through Power (IFTP), a fully automated DC Zonal Electric Distribution System (DC ZEDS) that provides flexible, reliable, high quality power to all shipboard loads. Other configurations are also being tested. The IPS system is fully automated with little operator intrusion.

The DDG 1000 engineering plant layout is relatively conventional because of the air intake, exhaust, and drive arrangement. DRS Technologies and General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems are developing a hybrid electric drive which permits a smaller service gas turbine to power a permanent magnet motor that can power the ship at slow or “loiter” speeds. Using a small- er turbine can result in significant fuel savings. Furthermore, the motor can be reversed to function as a generator when propul- sion gas turbines are online. Overall, integrated electric drive offers ship designers and operators a plant flexibility that does not exist with mechanical drive systems.

However, trade studies must be used to select the appropriate power and propulsion system for each ship. There are some ships with partial electric drive or hybrid elec- tric drive mechanical drive systems. These include the opera- tional Type 23 frigates; the European Multi-Mission Frigates (FREMM), a joint program between France and Italy, which are now in construction for France, Italy, Morocco and Greece; and the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8), now undergoing trials. Despite the advantages, there are not a lot of electric drive warships in service.

The new generation of electric ships has yet to prove themselves. The DDG 1000, Royal Navy Type 45, and T-AKE propositioning ships are examples of all-electric warships, but they are still in the design phase, under construction, or just entering service. Even though there is significant interest in electric drive systems, there are only a relatively small number of ships actually under construction and in operation.

Navy ALL-ELECTRIC INTEGRATED PROPULSION

The Navy is testing new concepts in power generation, conversion, and distribution to make ships more efficient, economic, and combat-effective.

ALL-ELECTRIC INTEGRATED PROPULSION

next-generation surface combatants, such as the DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class of guided missile destroy- ers will feature all-electric propulsion and an entirely new way of distributing power for propulsion, ship service, and combat capability. All-Electric Propulsion is a promising technology for both naval and commercial marine applications. An integrated power system (IPS) is an all-electric architecture, providing electric power to the total ship with an integrated plant. IPS enables a ship’s electrical loads, such as pumps and lighting, to be powered from the same electrical source as the propulsion system (e.g., electric drive), eliminating the need for separate power generation capabilities for these loads. To meet the increased power demands for new sea-based weapon systems,On the DDG 1000, power will be generated by two large gas turbine generators and two smaller ones. By using efficient power management, power is available to handle all of the electric loads throughout the ship, including potential future power-hungry weapons such as rail guns or directed energy weapons. The combat value of an electric ship goes well beyond weapon capability and capacity. There are significant efficiencies and redundancies. At full power, DDG 1000 will achieve speeds up to 30 knots. If one of the main turbines is lost, the plant can be isolated and still achieve 27 knots.
Among the major advantages of electric drive for naval ships is that the prime movers, whether gas turbines or diesels, do not need to be located in a central machinery space or mechanically connected to the propeller shaft as with traditional propulsion systems. For example, the engines can be placed in the bow, stern, or even in the superstructure for smaller engines. One of the advantages of distributed power in a warship is survivability. If an engine incurs damage or is incapacitated in one part of the ship, that part of the distribution system can be isolated while power can still be generated and distributed throughout the rest of the system.
Since a warship usually cruises at reduced power once it has arrived on station, normal station-keeping can be accommodated with the two small turbines to save fuel and reduce radiated noise. The power previ- ously trapped in the propulsion train can now be directed to enhance combat capability and mission flexibility. At lower speeds, Zumwalt has a surplus of power that can be made available as needed. Further advantages include the elimination of maintenance-intensive and high- temperature auxiliary steam systems, reduced noise and vibration, and better fuel efficiency.